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Abstract 
 
We address potential racial bias by Major League Baseball umpires with respect to ball-
strike calls. We offer a number of econometric specifications to test the robustness of the 
results, adding the role of implicit and explicit monitoring as well as pitch location. Our 
analysis shows mixed results regarding the matching of umpire and pitcher race. We 
conclude that evidence of own race bias is sensitive to specification and methodology.  
How results can differ based on different data sets, specifications, time periods and race 
classifications are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the principal functions of any league is to establish the proverbial “level 
playing field.”  It seems straightforward that the games themselves ought to be officiated 
similarly for each competitor and team.  As of late, officiating has come under increasing 
scrutiny in major league sports, with much of this scrutiny coming from the economics 
literature (e.g., Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, & Prendergast, 2005; Parsons, Sulaeman, 
Yates, & Hamermesh, 2011; Price & Wolfers 2010; Sutter & Kocher, 2004).  While some 
rules that govern play are highly subjective and therefore difficult to evaluate an official‟s 
performance and/or biases, other rules are clear in their definition of how to be enforced.   
A basic baseball statute that would seem to be unproblematic to interpret literally 
is the calling of balls and strikes.  According to Major League Baseball (MLB), the strike 
zone is “that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the 
midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower 
level is a line at the hollow beneath the knee cap.”  A ball is simply “a pitch which does 
not enter the strike zone in flight and is not struck at by the batter,” (MLB Official Rules, 
n.d.) and any pitch that is not struck at by the batter and is not a ball is called a strike.  
Yet, in spite of this straightforward definition, often announcers and/or pundits will speak 
to whether the home plate umpire has a wide strike zone, a tight strike zone, or even a 
high strike zone.  These considerations seem to contradict the charge of the umpires, to 
see that the contest is played under strict adherence to the rules, but do not necessarily 
present any direct unfairness towards particular players or groups of players.  The focus 
of this study is to gauge whether the calling of balls and strikes has been systematically 
applied differently for different players.  Specifically, if it were the case that there existed 
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a pattern of inequitable application of an objective rule like the calling of balls and strikes 
according to a player‟s race, this would not only be a case of direct unfairness, but 
discrimination. 
In the sections following we review the literature and then describe our empirical 
estimation.  We continue by detailing our analysis and the results of regression estimation 
for interaction effects between monitoring and race-matching of the umpire and pitcher.  
Finally, we address pitch location using the MLB Gameday Pitch f/x data set.  These 
findings are summarized in the final section, and we conclude with recommendations for 
future research. 
 
Review of Literature 
 As Groothuis and Hill (2011) stated, “(p)roclomations of racial discrimination 
always elicit notoriety. Findings of no discrimination do not procure the same response. 
Therefore, it is important that any positive findings of racially unequal treatment be 
particularly robust,” (p.2).  Research on discrimination in sports has been prevalent for 
nearly a quarter-century.  Although researchers have explored other leagues (e.g., 
DeBrock, Hendricks, & Koenker, 2003; Kahn, 1992; Jones & Walsh, 1988; Longley, 
2000, 2003), the bulk of these studies among North American professional sports leagues 
examine discrimination issues in the NBA, perhaps due to the unique racial 
demographics of the league‟s athletes.  The extant research on MLB discrimination has 
reconsidered many of the same issues first examined in the context of the NBA. The 
approach has been to apply Becker‟s (1971) model on labor discrimination as originating 
from consumer preferences, co-worker discrimination and/or employer prejudice to 
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identify whether differences exist and, if so, the source thereof. Racial sorting or 
matching are often tested empirically to both explain differences in economic rents and/or 
relative performance levels between players of different races. 
Given the wealth of research on discrimination in the NBA and the conceptual 
linkages to the narrower line of inquiry on subjective officiating, we begin there. In 
general the research supports the claim that some discrimination existed during the 1980s 
and began to disappear during the decade following. Kahn and Sherer (1988) examined 
salary determination in the NBA and found Blacks were paid roughly 20 percent less than 
Whites and, moreover, their results were robust to specification and estimation 
techniques. They also found that White players were associated with higher home 
attendance, but found no evidence of discrimination in the drafting of players into the 
league. Others found a lower (9-16 percent), albeit still statistically significant, premium 
for White NBA players during the same era (Brown, Spiro, & Keenan, 1988; Koch & 
VanderHill, 1988).  Burdekin and Idson (1991) found strong support that demand was 
positively related to the extent of the team-market racial match (customer discrimination), 
while others argued that employer discrimination was at the source and was erased with 
reductions in monopsony power (Bodvarsson & Brastow, 1999). Dey (1997) similarly 
found that the racial salary gap narrowed in the early 1990s, but attributed the effect to 
consumers no longer differentiating between White and Black players. This question was 
later reexamined to find that White stars tend to land in markets with larger White 
populations (Burdekin, Hossfield, & Smith, 2005). This is consistent with the research 
finding of no statistical differences between the overall salaries of Whites and Blacks or 
at the lower end of the distribution, with White players receiving an 18% premium at the 
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upper end of the salary distribution (Hamilton, 1997). Finally, Hill (2004) found no 
evidence of discrimination during the 1990s once height was entered into the pooled data, 
while Kahn and Shah (2005) found non-White shortfalls in salary for certain groups of 
players, but not across the population of NBA players.  
Although much of the discrimination-based literature has focused on wages, 
others have studied the point of discrimination.  Hoang and Rascher (1999) examined the 
role of exit discrimination and found White players faced a lower risk of being cut and 
therefore enjoyed longer careers and greater career earnings. Subsequent research found 
that this effect had also disappeared during the 1990s (Goothuis & Hill, 2004).  Testing 
for both wage and exit discrimination, a recent study showed evidence of reverse 
discrimination as well as a White premium, but neither result was robust to specifications 
(Groothuis & Hill, 2011). 
As stated earlier, most of the wage discrimination and points of discrimination 
findings reveal that the effects dissipated during the 1990s. With the declining effect, 
research increasingly turned to other sources of discrimination including coaches.  Fort, 
Lee, and Berri (2008) revisited Hoang and Rascher‟s (1999) question of exit 
discrimination within the coaching ranks. They found neither differences in the technical 
efficiency of coaches, nor in the retention of coaches according to race.  Schroffel and 
Magee (2011) discovered an own-race bias among NBA coaches.  They found evidence 
that NBA coaches allotted greater amounts of playing time to players of their own race 
during the late 1990s, but that declined in the early 2000s. 
Most closely related to the current study, the behavior of officials has been 
investigated across a range of sports and nations. Much of this research surrounds the 
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question of referee home team bias. The theory goes that home crowd advantage 
represents a social pressure (Courneya & Carron, 1992). If the crowd can induce a 
physiological response in players, as was shown by Neave and Wolfson (2003), then it 
can also influence the decision of referees. Nevill, Newell and Gale (1996) examined the 
number of penalties awarded in English and Scottish football and found that home teams 
were awarded significantly more penalties than visitors. Sutter and Kocher (2004) tested 
this notion further without the assumption of equal probability of being awarded a 
penalty.  They found that referees favored home teams in numerous ways, among them 
the tendency to award significantly extra time for an equalizer at the end of regulation 
when home teams trailed by exactly one goal and failure to award a significant number of 
legitimate penalties to the visiting team.  Similarly, Garicano and colleagues (2005) 
found that referees shortened close soccer games when the home team was ahead and 
lengthened those where it trailed.  Furthermore, they found referee bias was stronger with 
increased rewards for the home team and unusually high attendance. 
Just as with respect to player discrimination issues, the examination of US-based 
league officiating in the NBA preceded that of MLB. Price and Wolfers (2010) argued 
that the split-second calls made by NBA referees allow implicit biases to surface that 
otherwise may go unchecked.  In particular, they found that more personal fouls are 
awarded against players by opposite-race officiating crews than own-race crews. The 
results were sufficiently large to affect game and seasonal outcomes as well as the 
relative market value of Black versus White players. 
Finally, a similar study to ours was undertaken by Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and 
Hamermesh (2011, hereafter PSYH) using data from 2004-2008.  They focused on the 
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presence of discrimination among umpires when matched with own-race and other-race 
pitchers, finding favorable decisions resulted from umpire-pitcher matches.  Further, they 
showed that the effect vanished under the explicit monitoring conditions of the QuesTec 
evaluation system. Under implicit monitoring conditions, defined as pivotal pitches, 
pivotal at-bats or well-attended games, the effect again disappeared.  Finally, the 
researchers contended that pitchers may adjust their strategies as a consequence of fair 
versus biased umpire treatment.   
We believe our study presents several key differences with this paper.  For 
starters, our data is from a different data source and covers more seasons (1997-2008).  
This can be significant given the clustering required to study the underrepresented groups 
of pitchers and umpires. Consequently, the relative weight of one outing is more likely to 
be felt and potentially skew the outcome with respect to underrepresented groups even 
though the whole data set may seem large.  Also, given that race is not always clear, the 
two studies have different racial classifications.  Finally, the two studies have different 
specifications, and thus different results.  
 
Data 
Data detailing every pitching performance in MLB from 1997-2008 was obtained 
from baseball-reference.com and Sportvision‟s public MLB Gameday database.  Each 
observation covered a single pitching outing in our initial model, while data collected 
from Sportvision (2007 and 2008) included each individual pitch for our locational 
analysis.  The information provided included the pitcher‟s name, plate appearances 
(batters faced), total pitches, total strikes, called strikes, strikes swinging, strikes in play 
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(any batted ball in play is tallied as a strike), foul strikes, total balls, intentional balls, and 
the name of the home-plate umpire.   
Player race was then determined by internet investigation.  The race identification 
process began by searching for a player‟s profile on espn.com, and was completed when 
the researcher could confidently identify race. The primary considerations were a player‟s 
background information, including name origin, place of birth, and photos.  Among the 
sources that figured prominently in these searches were ESPN‟s list of current African-
American players, Wikipedia‟s list of Hispanic players, baseball-reference.com, 
mlb.com, and baseball-almanac.com.  Two individuals independently researched each 
pitcher‟s background and classified the pitcher as White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or any 
combination thereof.  Players for whom there was not sufficient information or lacked the 
consensus of both researchers were omitted from the analysis.  A similar process was 
utilized to classify umpire race; however, according to the same process no umpires were 
excluded in the data used for this analysis.  MLB.com‟s umpire page served as the 
primary resource for this investigation. 
The total number of strikes swinging, foul balls, strikes in play, and intentional 
balls were tabulated for each race in addition to the number falling into our categories of 
interest—strikes looking and unintentional balls.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize these data 
over the entire sample and 2004-08 alongside the results from PSYH for comparison.  
The row percentages speak to what was outlined in the introduction—there is some 
subjectivity in the strike zone of different umpires. Hispanic umpires had the highest 
called strike percentage, an increase of 0.53% and 0.98% over our entire sample 
compared to White and Black umpires, respectively. Taking into account this discrepancy 
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in called strike percentage among umpires, there was some consistency in the match of 
umpire and pitcher groups.  White pitchers received the highest called strike percentage 
from all three groups of umpires, and two of three called the lowest strike percentage for 
Black pitchers (Black pitchers received a slightly higher called strike percentage than 
Asian pitchers, but still lower than White and Hispanic pitchers, from Hispanic umpires).  
Also of note is that even though the sample has nearly 8.3 million pitches, the number is 
reduced greatly when examining some combinations of umpires and pitchers only for 
pitches subject to judgment by umpires.  Indeed, from 2004-2008, there were only around 
2,550 pitches thrown by Black pitchers requiring the judgment of Black umpires.   
During the time period of our data set, MLB implemented an umpire monitoring 
system known as QuesTec.  This system allowed the league to evaluate its umpires‟ 
performance by tracking the location of the ball when it crossed the plate.  This could 
explicitly change the cost of acting on any racial bias by the umpires across stadiums.  
The QuesTec system was not implemented in all stadiums in the league, allowing for 
comparison of explicitly monitored and unmonitored ball-strike calls for all umpires in 
our data. 
 
Player-Umpire Interactions by Race 
 Table 3 uses a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to estimate discrimination 
among combinations of umpire and pitcher race.  Difference-in-differences actually gives 
evidence in favor of reverse discrimination.  No matter the combination of umpire and 
pitcher (White/Hispanic, White/Black, Hispanic/Black)
1
, the difference-in-differences 
                     
1 There were no Asian umpires. 
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shows that umpires tended to be nearly neutral or favor pitchers of a different race when 
using data back through the 1997 season.
2
   
 Given the importance of monitoring (whether explicit or implicit), we also 
subdivided Table 2 and Table 3 for those stadiums with and without the QuesTec 
monitoring system in place (see Table 4).  The difference-in-differences outcomes hint 
toward reverse discrimination both with and without QuesTec present.  Finally, Figure 1 
presents the estimated bias across explicit monitoring situations for White and minority 
pitchers separately, aggregating those pitchers who are non-White.  We find no reversal 
pattern in discrimination behavior with White pitchers, but we do find a reversal with 
respect to minority pitchers.  This result calls for more careful analyses, as the overall 
trend shown in Figure 1 is in some disagreement with the specific difference-in-
differences in Table 4. 
OLS was then used to regress the percentage of called strikes on different 
variables. Table 5 presents the results of this regression using the percentage of called 
pitches being strike as the dependent variable.  The unit of observation in this case is a 
single pitcher outing.  For example, if a team used three pitchers over the course of one 
game, then this would count as three observations.  Because there is considerable 
variation in the duration of outing length, the regression was run for observations that had 
a minimum of 1, 10 and 50 called pitches.  Additionally, the model was run with and 
without fixed effects for pitcher, umpire and year.
3
 
                     
2 It is important to note that the DID analysis in Table 3, as well as our later analyses, are limited in that it 
is possible to find evidence of discrimination, it is not possible to tell who is discriminating. 
3 Batter fixed effects were not included, as the observations are at the pitcher-game level in order to account 
for in-game correlations, and pitchers face a number of different batters throughout the game. 
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We ran several versions of the model with the independent variable, Match, a 
binary indicator variable representing whether the umpire and pitcher are of the same 
race. QuesTec is an indicator variable representing whether the game was contested in a 
park fitted with the QuesTec system. This was included to evaluate whether the added 
scrutiny of the objective strike-gauging device influenced the called strike percentage. 
Match*QuesTec is a dummy variable at the intersection of the two previously described 
factors.  It quantifies whether the outing took place in a park fitted with the QuesTec 
system and there was a match of umpire and pitcher race. The final indicator variable, 
Home, represents whether the pitcher outing was in his home park. It may be the case that 
pitchers are more familiar with the surroundings and are therefore better able to 
accurately locate pitches in their home parks.  Whether this is the case is not the subject 
of this study, nonetheless it has been controlled for in the model.  We note that the race of 
the batter is not available due to the aggregated pitcher-game structure of our data, but 
could have important implications for model estimations. 
The results of the OLS regressions in Table 5 show little evidence of 
discrimination.  The only variables significant for the fixed effects estimation are the 
Home and QuesTec variables using the larger sample period of 1997 to 2008, indicating 
that a higher percentage of pitches are called a strike for the home pitcher and a higher 
percentage of pitches are called strikes in stadiums fitted with the QuesTec system.  The 
coefficient estimated for the Match variable is positive (indicating discrimination) and 
significant without fixed effects, but any Match effect is erased when fixed effects are 
used.  This result arises from inclusion of pitcher fixed effects, likely due to a correlation 
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between pitchers that throw a lot of strikes with Match.
4
  Additionally, no coefficients 
within the regression are significant with the reduced sample from 2004-2008 in the fixed 
effects regressions. 
These results are different from PSYH.  While Table 1 and Table 2 show similar 
descriptive statistics to PSYH, Table 3 starts to show differences in the data.  In Table 5 
we find little evidence of discrimination or change in discrimination, with or without 
QuesTec, which differs from PSYH.  Details of our attempt to reconcile the difference in 
results are given in the appendices.  While data differences and racial classifications do 
account for part of the difference, the greatest disparity in the results is due to a 
difference in specification.  The result that Match*QuesTec is significant relies heavily 
on using QuesTec-specific fixed effects.  In other words, if each pitcher is given one 
fixed effect, then Match*QuesTec is not significant, but if each pitcher has two fixed 
effects, one in QuesTec stadiums and one in non-QuestTec stadiums, then the variable is 
significant. 
 
Pitch f/x, Location and Agent Strategies 
Recently more detailed pitch data has become available through the MLB 
Gameday Pitch f/x database.  PSYH employ this data in order to evaluate changes in 
pitcher behavior due to umpire bias, and we follow suit here.  Pitch f/x data is able to 
identify the location of a pitch as well as the velocity.  It can also determine what type of 
pitch (e.g., fastball, curveball) was thrown.  We collected pitch f/x locational data for part 
                     
4 The results of all fixed effect combinations are available upon request. 
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of the 2007 season and all of the 2008 season.
5
  An effect posited in previous research is 
that the cost of discrimination changes due to implicit (e.g., attendance) or explicit (e.g., 
QuesTec) monitoring and that this should be present both before and after the 
implementation of Pitch f/x.  The argument made for pitcher-umpire race matched 
observations is the pitcher uses his knowledge of the umpire bias in his own favor, 
throwing more to the edges of the strike zone.  However, Sportvision‟s pitch f/x system 
would seem to be a constant explicit monitoring of umpire performance given that the 
data are publicly available.  Presumably the cost of discrimination does not change during 
the years in which pitch f/x data is available. 
In order to estimate the called strike zone from the data, we employ a semi-
parametric estimation of the pooled strike zone using a generalized additive model 
(GAM) and generalized cross-validation for estimation of the smoothing parameter for 
strike probability, given the pitch location.  With this we were able to evaluate the spatial 
features of the strike zone and identify pitches near the „edges‟ of the strike zone using a 
pooled estimation with all pitches.  The smoothing technique allows fitting of a surface 
dependent on batter handedness, pitch location and batter height.  Additionally, the 
flexible model can account for asymmetrical properties of the called strike zone, as 
opposed to the symmetrical ellipse used in PSYH.  The asymmetry can be seen in Figure 
2
6
, with lower pitches more likely to be called strikes on the outside corner than the 
                     
5 We restricted data to regular season games in regulation innings (1-9), those pitches which landed beyond 
the plate or above and within 2 feet on either side of the center of the rulebook strike zone.  We also 
exclude any intentional balls, pitchouts, or unidentified pitches in the data. 
6 Figures are from the view of the umpire in position behind the plate, facing out at the pitcher delivering 
the ball. 
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inside corner, and significant shifts in the location of the zone for left and right handed 
batters.
7
   
Using the predicted strike probabilities from the GAM, we defined an indicator 
variable equal to one if a pitch had a predicted probability of being called a strike 
between 40 and 60 percent (pooled GAM, see Figure 3).
8
  We used this indicator to 
estimate a linear probability model (LPM) gauging the likelihood of a pitcher to throw to 
the edges of the strike zone under matched and non-matched pitcher-umpire 
race/ethnicity while controlling for all other variables within the data.  These covariates 
included speed (in miles per hour), pitch type, inning, year, and the ball-strike count in 
which each pitch is thrown.  We attempted other characterizations of the „edge‟ of the 
zone—for example, between a 30 percent and 60 percent likelihood of a strike call—
however, these did not affect the ultimate conclusions of the analysis. 
In this model, positive coefficients indicate that a pitcher is more likely to throw 
to the edge of the strike zone, while negative coefficients would indicate that he is more 
likely to throw either well within or well outside the zone.  Table 6 presents the results of 
an LPM estimation using this data.  The only time pitchers change their propensity to 
throw within this „edge‟ region with a high level of statistical significance is when the 
count is no balls and two strikes, one ball and two strikes, or with certain types of pitches.  
This makes sense, as pitchers often try to get the hitter to „chase‟ an unhittable pitch 
when the count is no balls and two strikes, or one ball and two strikes.  In this model, 
there is no significant effect of matched race between the umpire and pitcher, the 
                     
7 As noted by a reviewer, this asymmetry could occur due to differentiated positioning of the umpire 
depending on the batter‟s handedness. 
8
 For brevity, we do not go into detail regarding the GAM estimation of the strike zone; however, the 
computer code for this calculation and a full explanation can be provided upon request.  For a full review of 
generalized additive modeling, the reader is referred to Wood (2000; 2003; 2004; 2011).   
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presence of the QuesTec system, or any significant interaction of matched race in the 
presence of QuesTec. 
Additionally, the boundaries of the called strike zone—defined as the contour 
band at which a strike is no longer more likely to be called than a ball—are exhibited in 
Figure 2 across umpire judgment scenarios from a purely pitch location-based, non-
parametric GAM for each scenario.  These visuals compare matched and non-matched 
pitcher-umpire race/ethnicity across stadiums with and without the presence of QuesTec.  
As the reader can see, there is a relatively ambiguous relationship between the size of the 
called strike zone from one setting to the other, at least related to discrimination by MLB 
umpires. 
We estimated a final model in order to lend further support to the edge-of-strike-
zone model by evaluating the linear distance from the center of the strike zone that 
pitchers throw their pitches in each situation.
9
  We begin with a fixed 2.6 foot height for 
the center of the strike zone and adjust this by each batter‟s height (moving the zone 
center up or down one-fifth of the difference between the batter‟s height in inches and the 
average height within the data set).  We note that height is an inexact measure, as batters 
have varying stances; however, this measure is intended as a relatively consistent proxy 
for the strike zone height center.  Using this measure and the horizontal center of home 
plate as the strike zone center, we calculate the linear distance from the center point of 
                     
9
 While PSYH use the upper and lower boundaries of the strike zone provided within Gameday‟s pitch f/x 
data (those input by the computer operator—or „stringer‟—at the time of the game) in order to evaluate 
whether a pitch was within or outside the strike zone, closer inspection reveals these measures are often 
inaccurate.  In many cases, there is a wide (or even bimodal) distribution of „upper‟ and „lower‟ strike zone 
limits.  Under this scenario, batter fixed effects may not be sufficient in dealing with the true strike zone 
center, and any correlation in the distribution across stringers at QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks could 
affect the coefficients in a regression. 
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the strike zone for each pitch when it crosses the plate, and use it as the dependent 
variable in the OLS estimation in Table 7.   
We again find no evidence of pitchers throwing further from, or closer to, the 
center of the strike zone when they are matched in race or ethnicity with the umpire.  The 
coefficient estimates indicate that pitchers tend to throw closer to the center of the strike 
zone in QuesTec parks, but with no significant effect of race matching or its interaction 
with the presence of QuesTec.  This is consistent with the higher strike rates overall in 
QuesTec parks found in the primary estimations of this paper. 
It is important to note that this data set includes a number of pitches that would 
certainly be called balls.  This could affect coefficient estimates if many of these pitches 
are those that were errantly thrown, and not highly correlated with the pitcher‟s intended 
location.  Therefore, we reduced the data for ancillary models including only pitches 
predicted to be called a strike from the pooled GAM estimation with a probability above 
10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%, respectively.  The results of these models did not 
significantly impact any of the coefficients regarding race/ethnicity or presence of 
QuesTec from the initial estimation, and are not presented here.
10
 
 
Conclusion 
Findings of this research provide a challenge to the suggestions that there is racial 
or ethnic discrimination in the calling of balls and strikes by MLB umpires, and that 
pitchers react to that bias.  Although portions of our data do not contain all of the control 
variables used in previous work, the analyses presented in this study demonstrate that the 
finding of MLB umpire discrimination is not particularly robust.  We ran multiple 
                     
10 The results of these models are available upon request. 
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estimations with various data sets and measures accounting for factors that could 
potentially explain variation in called strike percentage.  With our data, only when 
pitcher, umpire and year effects were not accounted for was there any support for the 
notion that there was discrimination.  We caution that even with multiple seasons and 
millions of pitches these data may still be subject to fluctuations in underrepresented 
umpire-pitcher matches, especially when these small subsets are divided into smaller 
ones with multiple fixed effects. Furthermore, the results may be sensitive to racial 
coding and/or different specifications.   
Much of the empiricism of this and previous work centers on whether there are 
systematic differences in the calling of balls and strikes according to race and, in 
particular, match of umpire and pitcher race. In all of the above scenarios, the evidence 
for discrimination was mixed, at best, and at times signaled reverse-discrimination. We 
further evaluated whether any advantage (disadvantage) may have induced pitchers to 
approach their trade differently depending on umpire race. Again this hypothesis was 
unsupported.  
These findings, of course, do not preclude the lessons of considering underlying 
discrimination in econometric estimations using supposedly objective performance data.  
However, we advocate proceeding with caution when categorical groups may be highly 
influenced by a small number of clustered observations, as in the data presented here.  
Despite the large sample size overall, the standard caveats of small samples nonetheless 
apply when even just a few observations have the potential to alone influence the 
presence or absence of an observed effect among the subsets of groups.  
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Furthermore, categorical race-coding is an inexact—and oftentimes severely 
biased—method of evaluating discrimination in this situation.  In this case we adopt the 
elementary coding schema in order to mirror the previous research and replicate 
accordingly.  How the findings of the current study would manifest under a more 
sophisticated racial coding method is an important area for future exploration. Further 
research in this area using more robust race classifications or measures, as exhibited by 
Fort and Gill (2000), would be a welcome addition to the present analysis.   
While we stress that previous studies were rather extensive in their analyses, the 
secondary purpose of this study is to show that replication of the results is not 
straightforward given a different data set, racial classification, or specification.  While 
some of our results are similar to previous work there are also differences.  Investigation 
into these differences shows that the largest disagreements were due to specification 
dissimilarities.  Other analysts have had trouble finding umpire discrimination as well 
(Birnbaum 2008).  Given the sensitivity of racial discrimination, we argue, 
straightforwardly, counter evidence should be given equal weight. 
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Figure 1 
Comparison of QuesTec and Non-QuesTec Parks 
 
 
Note: Vertical axes indicate the percentage of umpire-called pitches that were called strikes in the 
given scenario. 
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Figure 2 
Strike Zone Comparison for Matched Race and QuesTec Presence 
 
 
Note: These graphs are from the umpire‟s perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Strike Zone Band for Table 8 (40% to 60% Strike Probability) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
1997-2008 
 N Total 
pitches 
Called 
strike 
Called 
ball 
Swinging 
strike 
Foul In 
play 
Intentional 
ball 
Hit 
by 
pitch 
All  8,290,073 16.68 37.10 8.96 16.94 19.63 0.63  
Pitcher          
White 1,357 5,994,819 16.77 37.03 8.80 16.93 19.79 0.63  
Hispanic 416 1,810,392 16.45 37.18 9.41 17.00 19.25 0.66  
Black 65 260,153 16.05 37.73 9.26 17.27 19.10 0.55  
Asian 45 225,396 16.52 37.65 9.29 16.67 19.25 0.57  
Umpire          
White 134 7,560,068 16.67 37.10 8.96 16.95 19.64 0.63  
Hispanic 7 339,438 16.96 36.78 8.92 16.99 19.64 0.66  
Black 8 390,567 16.48 37.44 8.98 16.83 19.59 0.63  
          
2004-08 
 N Total 
pitches 
Called 
strike 
Called 
ball 
Swinging 
strike 
Foul In 
play 
Intentional 
ball 
Hit 
by 
pitch 
All  3,527,750 17.02 36.59 8.77 17.32 19.55 0.66  
Pitcher          
White 830 2,489,818 17.10 36.49 8.57 17.34 19.73 0.66  
Hispanic 285 837,598 16.80 36.85 9.32 17.24 19.01 0.68  
Black 32 88,806 16.18 36.67 9.50 17.78 19.24 0.53  
Asian 34 93,491 17.07 36.90 8.68 16.84 19.81 0.59  
Umpire          
White 91 3,204,574 17.02 36.57 8.78 17.32 19.55 0.66  
Hispanic 6 159,623 17.12 36.52 8.71 17.40 19.46 0.69  
Black 6 163,553 16.92 36.91 8.77 17.13 19.55 0.63  
          
Parsons et al. 2004-08 
 N Total 
pitches 
Called 
strike 
Called 
ball 
Swinging 
strike 
Foul In 
play 
Intentional 
ball 
Hit 
by 
pitch 
All  3,524,624 17.09 36.56 8.98 17.08 19.41 0.63 0.25 
Pitcher          
White 861 2,544,515 17.19 36.48 8.77 17.1 19.58 0.64 0.24 
Hispanic 278 793,797 16.86 36.77 9.57 17.03 18.86 0.64 0.27 
Black 37 89,355 16.24 36.68 9.71 17.54 19.07 0.52 0.24 
Asian 39 96,957 17.12 36.81 8.87 16.59 19.7 0.64 0.27 
Umpire          
White 91 3,215,949 17.09 36.55 8.97 17.09 19.41 0.64 0.25 
Hispanic 5 111,524 17.06 36.8 8.87 16.97 19.33 0.7 0.27 
Black 6 197,151 17.13 36.63 9.00 16.99 19.44 0.59 0.22 
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Table 2 
Summary of Called Pitches by Umpire-Pitcher Racial/Ethnic Match 
 
1997-2008 
 Pitcher race/ethnicity  
 White Hispanic Black Asian Total percent 
called strikes 
Umpire race/ethnicity      
White      
Pitches 5,467,744 1,650,047 238,329 204,379  
Called pitches 2,941,402 885,174 128,169 110,587  
Called strikes 916,583 271,605 38,326 33,744  
Percent called strikes 31.16 30.68 29.90 30.51 31.00 
Hispanic      
Pitches 242,596 77,285 9,233 9,876  
Called pitches 130,415 41,368 4,987 5,409  
Called strikes 41,394 12,891 1,521 1,643  
Percent called strikes 31.74 31.16 30.50 30.38 31.53 
Black      
Pitches 284,479 83,060 12,591 11,141  
Called pitches 153,667 44,409 6,765 6,110  
Called strikes 47,379 13,297 1,907 1,855  
Percent called strikes 30.83 29.94 28.19 30.36 30.55 
      
Total percent called strikes 31.17 30.67 29.84 30.50 31.00 
2004-08 
 Pitcher race/ethnicity  
 White Hispanic Black Asian Total percent 
called strikes 
Umpire race/ethnicity      
White      
Pitches 2,259,295 762,949 80,841 85,737  
Called pitches 1,210,519 409,267 42,706 46,223  
Called strikes 386,391 128,262 13,082 14,647  
Percent called strikes 31.92 31.34 30.63 31.69 31.74 
Hispanic      
Pitches 113,945 36,896 3,116 4,168  
Called pitches 61,086 19,762 1,682 2,279  
Called strikes 19,528 6,241 550 714  
Percent called strikes 31.97 31.58 32.70 31.33 31.88 
Black      
Pitches 116,578 37,753 4,849 3,586  
Called pitches 62,759 20,335 2,550 1,960  
Called strikes 19,936 6,232 741 600  
Percent called strikes 31.77 30.65 29.06 30.61 31.40 
      
Total percent called strikes 31.91 31.32 30.62 31.63 31.73 
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Parsons et al. 2004-08 
 Pitcher race/ethnicity  
 White Hispanic Black Asian Total percent 
called strikes 
Umpire race/ethnicity      
White      
Pitches 2,319,522 726,137 81,251 89,039  
Called pitches 1,244,523 389,411 42,986 47,973  
Called strikes 398,673 122,441 13,194 15,269  
Percent called strikes 32.03 31.44 30.69 31.83 31.86 
Hispanic      
Pitches 80,956 24,844 2,559 3,165  
Called pitches 43,632 13,299 1,374 1,760  
Called strikes 13,857 4,194 429 549  
Percent called strikes 31.76 31.54 31.22 31.19 31.68 
Black      
Pitches 144,037 42,816 5,545 4,753  
Called pitches 77,472 23,035 2,922 2,561  
Called strikes 24,900 7,195 886 784  
Percent called strikes 32.14 31.24 30.32 30.61 31.86 
      
Total percent called strikes 32.03 31.43 30.69 31.75 31.86 
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Table 3  
Difference-in-differences  
(positive values denote bias in favor of umpires’ own race or ethnicity) 
 
1997-2008 
Races/Ethnicities compared Difference-in-differences 
 
White/Hispanic
a 
-0.10 
White/Black -1.38 
Hispanic/Black -0.09 
2004-2008 
Races/Ethnicities compared Difference-in-differences 
 
White/Hispanic 0.19 
White/Black -1.42 
Hispanic/Black -2.71 
Parsons et al. 2004-2008 
Races/Ethnicities compared Difference-in-differences 
 
White/Hispanic 0.37 
White/Black -0.48 
Hispanic/Black -0.60 
a. This DID estimate, for example, is calculated by taking the difference between the 
change in White umpire strike rate going from a White pitcher (match) to a Hispanic 
pitcher, and the change in Hispanic umpire strike rate going from a Hispanic pitcher 
(match) to a White pitcher.  In this respect, it measures the difference in the changes 
across pitcher race/ethnicity for White and Hispanic umpires, but does not allow for 
evaluation of which (or if both) race/ethnicity is discriminating.  All other calculations 
for race/ethnicity combinations follow this strategy.
Table 4 
Comparison of QuesTec and Non-QuesTec Parks by Race/Ethnicity Match (1997-2008) 
 
QUESTEC  NO QUESTEC 
Pitcher R/E: White Hispanic Black Asian 
 
Pitcher R/E: White Hispanic Black Asian 
Umpire R/E      Umpire R/E     
White 
     
White  
    Pitches 979,795 323,712 42,838 37,153 
 
Pitches 4,487,949 1,326,335 195,491 167,226 
Called Pitches 526,223 174,138 22,752 20,108 
 
Called Pitches 2,415,179 711,036 105,417 90,479 
Called Strikes 168,643 54,626 7,089 6,355 
 
Called Strikes 747,940 216,979 31,237 27,389 
Strike Rate 32.05% 31.37% 31.16% 31.60% 
 
Strike Rate 30.97% 30.52% 29.63% 30.27% 
           Hispanic 
     
Hispanic  
    Pitches 47,675 15,775 1,269 1,511 
 
Pitches 194,921 61,510 7,964 8,365 
Called Pitches 25,542 8,463 700 825 
 
Called Pitches 104,873 32,905 4,287 4,584 
Called Strikes 8,286 2,657 223 268 
 
Called Strikes 33,108 10,234 1,298 1,375 
Strike Rate 32.44% 31.40% 31.86% 32.48% 
 
Strike Rate 31.57% 31.10% 30.28% 30.00% 
           Black 
     
Black  
    Pitches 49,963 15,863 2,485 1,843 
 
Pitches 234,516 67,197 10,106 9,298 
Called Pitches 26,951 8,539 1,326 1,012 
 
Called Pitches 126,716 35,870 5,439 5,098 
Called Strikes 8,689 2,537 381 323 
 
Called Strikes 38,690 10,760 1,526 1,532 
Strike Rate 32.24% 29.71% 28.73% 31.92% 
 
Strike Rate 30.53% 30.00% 28.06% 30.05% 
Difference-in-Differences  Difference-in-Differences 
White/Hispanic -0.37% 
    
White/Hispanic -0.02% 
   White/Black -2.62% 
    
White/Black -1.14% 
   Hispanic/Black -1.44% 
    
Hispanic/Black -1.12% 
   
Table 5 
OLS Estimates Using Pitcher outing as Unit of Observation
a 
    
1997-2008  Minimum of 1 pitch Minimum of 10 pitches Minimum of 50 pitches 
Constant 0.305*** ----- 0.298*** ----- 0.307*** ----- 
  (0.00075) ----- (0.00056) ----- (0.00070) ----- 
Match 0.00622*** -0.00145 0.00531*** -0.00099 0.00332*** -0.00300* 
  (0.00081) (0.00176) (0.00061) (0.00128) (0.00076) (0.00156) 
QuesTec 0.0131*** 0.00432*** 0.00973*** 0.00331*** 0.00967*** 0.00518*** 
  (0.00149) (0.00160) (0.00113) (0.00117) (0.00138) (0.00142) 
Match*QuesTec -0.00254 0.00006 -0.00030 0.00126 0.00171 0.00005 
  (0.00186) (0.00197) (0.00139) (0.00143) (0.00169) (0.00171) 
Home 0.00596*** 0.00591*** 0.00404*** 0.00418*** 0.00410*** 0.00393*** 
  (0.00069) (0.00068) (0.00051) (0.00049) (0.00063) (0.00058) 
              
Pitcher FE
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Umpire FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
              
N 208,266 208,266 123,792 123,792 33,984 33,984 
R
2
 0.001 0.045 0.003 0.105 0.007 0.186 
       
2004-2008  Minimum of 1 pitch Minimum of 10 pitches Minimum of 50 pitches 
Constant 0.318*** ----- 0.308*** ----- 0.317*** ----- 
  (0.00122) ----- (0.00093) ----- (0.00117) ----- 
Match 0.00478*** 0.00009 0.00506*** 0.00230 0.00518*** -0.00210 
  (0.00137) (0.00265) (0.00104) (0.00195) (0.00132) (0.00245) 
QuesTec 0.00288 -0.00050 0.00214 -0.00098 0.00189 -0.00014 
  (0.00180) (0.00189) (0.00137) (0.00139) (0.00170) (0.00168) 
Match*QuesTec -0.00081 -0.00064 -0.00056 0.000100 -0.00142 -0.00194 
  (0.00227) (0.00235) (0.00170) (0.00171) (0.00209) (0.00204) 
Home 0.00146 0.00151 0.00056 0.00038 0.00037 0.00056 
  (0.00105) (0.00103) (0.00079) (0.00074) (0.00096) (0.00088) 
        
Pitcher FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Umpire FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        
N 92,012 92,012 52,958 52,958 14,269 14,269 
R
2
 0.000 0.049 0.001 0.115 0.002 0.187 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. a. We also have pitcher-only and umpire-
only fixed effects models available upon request.  These discerned that the change in significance of the Match variable originates 
from inclusion of pitcher fixed effects, likely due to the significant weight of White-White matches, with White pitchers throwing 
more strikes on average than pitchers of other races. 
 
 
Table 6 
LPM Estimates for Propensity to Throw to Edge of Strike Zone (2007-2008)
a 
 40% to 60% Pooled
b 
Predictor Variable Coef. Est.
c 
Std. Error 
Constant ----- ----- 
Right Handed Pitcher 0.00611 0.00743 
Pitch Starting Speed 0.00019 0.00011 
Curveball
d 
-0.00710*** 0.00173 
Changeup -0.00317*** 0.00121 
Cutter 0.00122 0.00217 
Four-Seam Fastball 0.00221 0.00372 
Splitter -0.0101*** 0.00404 
Two-Seam Fastball 0.01370 0.02060 
Knuckleball -0.00186 0.00951 
Sinker -0.00507* 0.00297 
Slider -0.00475*** 0.00109 
Bases Loaded
e 
-0.00150 0.00158 
First and Second -0.00089 0.00099 
First and Third -0.00138 0.00146 
On First -0.00115* 0.00067 
On Second 0.00045 0.00095 
On Third 0.00011 0.00157 
Second and Third 0.00031 0.00185 
0-1 Count
f 
-0.00092 0.00086 
0-2 Count -0.0107*** 0.00110 
1-0 Count 0.00068 0.00091 
1-1 Count 0.00063 0.00092 
1-2 Count -0.00713*** 0.00095 
2-0 Count -0.00021 0.00139 
2-1 Count 0.00159 0.00118 
2-2 Count -0.00166 0.00102 
3-0 Count 0.00039 0.00240 
3-1 Count -0.00034 0.00171 
3-2 Count -0.00078 0.00126 
Home Team at Bat 0.00030 0.00052 
Race Match -0.00204 0.00124 
QuesTec 0.00101 0.00108 
Match*QuesTec 0.00056 0.00125 
N: 952,375 
R^2: 0.0026 
Pitch Location Distribution
 
Pitches Proportion 
Inside 438,446 46.04% 
Edge 60,051 6.31% 
Outside 453,878 47.66% 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively. a. Dependent variable is probability of 
throwing a pitch to the edge of the strike zone and model includes umpire, pitcher, and batter fixed effects, with controls for inning 
and year the pitch is thrown (2007 or 2008). b. Denotes definition of the “edge” of the strike zone using pooled GAM model for 
likelihood of a strike call. c. Batter handedness and height excluded, as it was used to create “Edge of Strike Zone” variable. d. Pitch 
types compared to generic “Fastball” classification as the base level. e. Base level of empty bases. f. Base level of 0-0 count. 
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Table 7 
LPM Estimates for Pitch Linear Distance from Center (2007-2008)
a 
Predictor Variable
b 
Coef. Est.
b 
Std. Error 
Constant ----- ----- 
Right Handed Batter -0.41495*** 0.04050 
Right Handed Pitcher -0.08194 0.20624 
Batter Height -0.29870*** 0.03860 
Pitch Starting Speed -0.01382*** 0.00306 
Changeup 1.28787*** 0.03423 
Curveball 0.66980*** 0.05115 
Cutter 0.39509*** 0.05695 
Four-Seam Fastball -0.50544*** 0.09490 
Splitter 1.67355*** 0.12683 
Two-Seam Fastball 0.65175 0.46254 
Knuckleball 1.34863*** 0.29798 
Sinker 1.02514*** 0.08179 
Slider 0.84845*** 0.03164 
Bases Loaded 0.15286*** 0.04408 
First and Second 0.25096*** 0.02739 
First and Third 0.47609*** 0.04094 
On First 0.10561*** 0.01844 
On Second 0.42359*** 0.02626 
On Third 0.71462*** 0.04399 
Second and Third 0.63786*** 0.05288 
Inning 0.01060*** 0.00380 
2008 Season -0.05534*** 0.01872 
0-1 Count 1.20321*** 0.02380 
0-2 Count 3.30847*** 0.03559 
1-0 Count -0.35783*** 0.02370 
1-1 Count 0.39924*** 0.02489 
1-2 Count 2.07670*** 0.02854 
2-0 Count -0.79961*** 0.03556 
2-1 Count -0.50632*** 0.03057 
2-2 Count 0.75013*** 0.02876 
3-0 Count -1.06530*** 0.06000 
3-1 Count -1.09705*** 0.04296 
3-2 Count -0.74376*** 0.03385 
Home Team at Bat -0.00849 0.01418 
Race/Ethnicity Match -0.00527 0.03478 
QuesTec -0.05992** 0.02994 
Match*QuesTec 0.04091 0.03439 
N: 952,375   
R^2: 0.0752   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively.  a. Dependent 
variable is the pitch‟s distance from center point of the strike zone in inches.  Model includes umpire, 
pitcher, and batter fixed effects. b. Base levels for factor variables are the same as in Table 6. c. Negative 
coefficient implies pitch is closer to the center point of the strike zone.
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Appendix 1: Direct Replication of PSYH 
 
We first try to replicate the results of PSYH with our own data, reducing our 
sample to only the 2004-2008 seasons.  However, as noted earlier, there are a number of 
differences in our data sets.  PSYH collected their data from espn.com and Sportvision‟s 
Gameday database; our sample comes from baseball-reference.com for 2004-2006, while 
we use the same data source as PSYH for 2007-2008. This may result in some variation, 
for example a small number of pitches from baseball-reference.com are categorized as 
“unknown strikes.”  Also, data from rained out games might be handled differently since 
not all games become official. 
 One important factor in our sample differences is related to race classification.  
There is considerable subjectivity when classifying umpires or pitchers by race.  In Table 
2 we report a comparison of the number of called pitches and the percentage of called 
strikes according to umpire race and pitcher race using our data and PSYH.  First, the 
totals are different, indicating that there are small discrepancies between the data sources. 
Second, and notably, in some cases the pitcher-umpire intersection figures vary a great 
deal.  This is largely attributable to different coding of umpire race by PSYH and in the 
current study.  Specifically, in our analysis we coded umpire Laz Diaz as Hispanic based 
on his background and personal correspondence.  However, PSYH coded him as Black, 
perhaps due to his skin tone and the fact that he is from the United States.  The conflation 
of race and ethnicity can cause significant problems.  As highlighted by Fort and Gill 
(2000), if race is the variable of interest, then categorical measures may be inappropriate 
altogether. When Laz Diaz is coded as Black, he accounts for 24.7% of pitches called by 
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Black umpires.  When Laz Diaz is coded as Hispanic, he accounts for 32.5% of called 
pitches by Hispanic umpires.  Thus, even though we have over 3.5 million pitches in the 
2004-2008 data base, misclassification of one individual alone can change the analysis, 
altering the results or at the very least making the results less robust. 
Returning to the difference-in-differences in Table 3 from the paper, both our data 
and PSYH have positive values for White/Hispanic matchups in the 2004-2008 sample, 
indicating discrimination.  Like PSYH, our data reveal negative values for White/Black 
and Hispanic/Black.  However, our comparable 2004-2008 data find that reverse 
discrimination effect for the latter two groups is much larger than the favoritism given by 
White umpires to White pitchers compared to Hispanic pitchers.  At minimum, the results 
in Table 3 of the paper show that the difference-in-differences results vary according to 
the time period. 
Central to the contribution of PSYH, however, is that discrimination does not 
always exist—the effect dissipated in stadiums that used QuesTec technology and 
according to game situation.  The implication was that discrimination occurred when 
umpires were not being monitored.  The data from espn.com contained variables not 
included on baseball-reference.com.  Specifically, the game situation data—for example, 
the count, inning and attendance—were not made available to us for all of 2004-2008. 
Consequently, we focused the replication of PSYH‟s explicit monitoring on the presence 
or absence of QuesTec (see Tables A-1 and A-2).  PSYH uses multiple fixed effects for 
each pitcher, batter, and umpire—one for QuesTec stadiums and one for stadiums 
without QuesTec.  In order to make an accurate comparison to our estimates, we remove 
control variables and fit both single and QuesTec-unique fixed effects for the estimates 
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from the PSYH data and our own.  Here, we replicate our aggregated data in order to fit a 
model using each pitch as an individual observation (in contrast to Table 5, where we use 
pitcher-umpire-game events).  As evidenced by the data in Table A-1, any significant 
effects of the race matching variable again disappear when including pitcher, umpire 
fixed effects.  Due to the structure of our data, we were not able to include batter fixed 
effects in the estimation; but, this further model exhibits that standard errors were not 
simply reduced by aggregating our data at the game-pitcher-umpire level.  Additionally, 
the PSYH data set shows neither evidence of discrimination, nor effects of monitoring in 
this simplified form with single fixed effects.  There are mixed results, however, when 
using QuesTec and non-QuesTec unique fixed effects for each pitcher and umpire.  This 
specification, originally used by PSYH, will be expanded upon later.  
Next we attempt to further reconcile our results with PSYH through corrections in 
the data, and from here on use the data and code provided by PSYH modified as 
exhibited in Appendix 2.  Table A-2 shows estimates using the data from PSYH in its 
original form as well as after rectifying various discrepancies within the identification of 
players and their race or ethnicity.  Panel A (of the top row) represents the original 
estimation of PSYH with their data and code.   
Panel B consolidates pitcher identifications, as 34 pitchers had two or more 
identification numbers in the original PSYH data.  Next, Panel C eliminates five pitchers 
whose names could not be identified as a pitcher who pitched in MLB over the time 
period.  Panel D then deletes pitchers that appear to have inconsistencies as to their pitch 
count.  For example, in the PSYH data, Edgar Gonzalez had 1201 called pitches and 
Enrique Gonzalez had 1730 called pitches.  In our data set, over the same time period, 
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Edgar Gonzalez had 1976 called pitches and Enrique Gonzalez had 975 called pitches.  
Given that from 2004 to 2008 Edgar Gonzalez had over twice as many innings pitched, it 
seems likely that our data is more accurate, as the pitches-per-inning ratios align more 
closely.  Therefore, pitchers with these types of discrepancies were eliminated from the 
sample.  Panel E then changes the race classification for certain pitchers.  Changes were 
made to reflect the race classifications in our original classifications.  Also, pitchers that 
we originally classified as “other” were removed from the sample.  The estimations were 
run with Laz Diaz as Black and then Hispanic.  We also ran the estimation to include 
Asian pitchers while Laz Diaz is classified as Hispanic (Panel F). 
Lastly, while the specification of QuesTec-unique fixed effects does not make the 
model incorrect, one could argue that each pitcher should only have one fixed effect.  The 
selective use of two fixed effects assumes a differential change in behavior across 
QuesTec conditions at the individual pitcher level.  Even if pitchers are aware of the 
presence of QuesTec and its possible impact on race-based bias by the umpire, treating a 
single pitcher as a completely different player in each park would seem to lose important 
information about that player.  This is essentially the treatment given by PSYH when 
creating two fixed effects for each player independent of one another.  Additionally, this 
choice is rather selective as individual pitchers change their behavior in different ways 
depending on the ball-strike count or whether they are home or away.  If the assumption 
is that multiple fixed effects are necessary for individual level QuesTec changes, then 
these should also be specified for other conditions that are more directly apparent to 
players such as home park and ball-strike count.  Therefore, we estimate each of the 
panels in Table A-2 using only a single fixed effect for each pitcher, batter and umpire.  
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This change ultimately results in large changes in the magnitude and significance of 
coefficients in the model.  Table A-2 shows that the coefficient estimate for matching 
umpire and pitcher race is reduced by nearly 60%, while those coefficient estimates 
associated with both explicit (i.e., QuesTec) and implicit (i.e., high attendance) 
monitoring are no longer statistically significant within the regression.  Much of this 
difference is due to the consolidation of fixed effects. 
Of course, the lesson from PSYH regarding impact of discrimination implicit in 
measurement through subjective evaluation is well taken.  However, we show here that—
while the point made is valid and important—the data from Major League Baseball is 
sensitive to various specifications and samples. 
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Appendix 2: Explanation of Table A-2 
 
Preliminary Description 
All models in Table A-2 are versions of Model 9 from Parsons et al., Page 1422, Table 5, 
Panel C.  This is the most complete model and includes all variables.  We use the code 
from PSYH, with an adjustment for the consolidation of pitcher codes in order to produce 
*new* unique identifiers for non-QuesTec and QuesTec stadiums where necessary. 
 
QuesTec-Unique vs. Single Fixed Effects 
Table A-2 exhibits all models both with a single fixed effect for each batter, pitcher and 
umpire, and the originally specified QuesTec-unique fixed effects for each in PSYH. 
 
Diaz Black vs. Diaz Hisp. 
Each model is fit with Laz Diaz as the originally classified Black umpire that PSYH 
included in their data.  Those with Laz Diaz coded as Hispanic are the exact same models 
as described below, but include a newly classified Laz Diaz (as Hispanic).  The race-
match variables are adjusted to include this change as well. 
 
MODELS: 
Panel A: Includes model for original data from the paper with no adjustment unless Laz 
Diaz or Fixed Effects changes are specified at the table heading. 
 
Panel B: Consolidates pitcher codes that had multiple entries and multiple codes.  This is 
in order to remove the additional fixed effects created by this.  In the code, we recreate 
the QuesTec-unique identification codes for all pitchers to account for this.  The 
consolidated codes are described below: 
Player Name Duplicate ID Changed to (Original ID) 
Brian Anderson 397 17 
Alberto Arias 2006 2005 
Cha Seung Baek 765 36 
Brian Bass 2016 2015 
Billy Buckner 20070003 2027 
Valerio De Los Santos 943 748 
Chris Demania 944 207 
Matt DeSalvo 20070012 2047 
Lenny Dinardo 216 212 
Geno Espineli 2055 2054 
Sean Gallagher 2060 2059 
Edgar Gonzalez 307 306 
Enrique Gonzalez 309 308 
Geremi Gonzalez 311 310 
Joel Hanrahan 20070021 2070 
Philip Humber 20070024 394 
Wil Ledezma 2099 & 2100 455 
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Dan Meyer 2122 544 
Josh Newman 2135 2134 
Ross Ohlendorf 2140 2139 
Chan Ho Park 623 380 
Bobby Parnell 2148 2147 
Scott Patterson 2152 2151 
Jae Kuk Ryu 730 448 
Bobby Seay 945 759 
Paul Shuey 20070044 20070043 
Joakim Soria 2190 2189 
Levale Speigner 20070045 2191 
John Van Benschoten 856 65 
Jermaine Van Buren 855 115 
Tod Van Poppel 857 656 
Rick Vanden Hurk 20070025 2202 
Jared Wells 2208 2207 
Randy Wells 2210 2209 
 
Panel C: Has same characteristics of previous file, but deletes 5 unidentifiable pitchers 
from the analysis.  These include the following pitcher codes and reduces the data 
trivially from 1,838,676 to 1,838,487: 
Original “pid” Pitcher Name (Parsons et al. Key) 
135 Sil Campusano 
417 b Jones 
492 Bobby M 
853 g valera 
2045 Frankie de 
 
Panel D: This is a second round of consolidation and deletion of pitcher codes that have 
serious anomalies or overlap between two players.  For example, the confusion in “de 
paula”, “en gonzalez”, and “ed gonzalez”.  This is a larger task than the last and deletes 
20 players, reducing the observations from 1,838,487 to 1,788,126: 
Original “pid” First/Last Name (Parsons et al. Key) 
205 jorge depaula 
262 randy flores 
263 ron flores 
306 ed gonzalez 
308 en gonzalez 
410 jason johnson 
411 jim johnson 
412 josh johnson 
548 justin miller 
610 ramon rrtiz 
611 russ ortiz 
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629 de paula 
635 tony pena 
675 ramon ramirez 
691 al reyes 
692 anthony reyes 
890 jeff weaver 
891 jered weaver 
928 jamey wright 
929 jaret wright 
 
Panel E: This step changes the race of a number of pitchers from White to Hispanic, 
Hispanic to White, and deletes those classified as “other” in our data.  Pitcher-umpire 
race match variables are adjusted to accommodate new classifications.  The sample size 
is reduced from 1,788,126 to 1,779,041.  These changes include: 
Original “pid” Pitcher Name Race Changed To: 
26 Bronson Arroyo DELETED 
2036 Joba Chamberlain DELETED 
738 Brian Sanches DELETED 
149 Frank Castillo White  Hispanic 
151 Jaime Cerda White  Hispanic 
175 Chad Cordero White  Hispanic 
181 Nate Cornejo White  Hispanic 
259 Nelson Figueroa White  Hispanic 
281 Brian Fuentes White  Hispanic 
2058 Armando Gallaraga White  Hispanic 
320 Danny Graves DELETED 
2109 Warner Madrigal White  Hispanic 
2112 Justin Masterson Hispanic  White 
518 Thomas Mastny DELETED 
576 Rodney Myers Black White 
2150 Manny Parra White  Hispanic 
674 Horacio Ramirez White  Hispanic 
2159 Clay Rapada White  Hispanic 
2162 Jojo Reyes White  Hispanic 
734 Chris Seanz White  Hispanic 
2199 Erick Threets White  Hispanic 
 
Panel F: This data set includes all of the previous changes to the data, but then goes on 
to include Asian pitchers within the data.  Here, the sample size increases from 1,779,041 
to 1,829,482.  This combined with all of the other changes reduces the coefficients the 
most toward zero, but most are still statistically significant. 
  
Table A-1 
LPM Estimates Using Individual Pitches as Unit of Observation (2004-2008) 
 
 Current Analysis Parsons et al. Data 
 No Fixed Effects Single FE QuesTec Unique FEs No Fixed Effects Single FE QuesTec Unique FEs 
Constant 0.313*** ----- ----- 0.315*** ----- ----- 
 (0.00076) ----- ----- (0.00074) ----- ----- 
Match 0.00602*** 0.00009 0.00322 0.00572*** 0.00119 0.00409* 
 (0.00093) (0.00179) (0.00216) (0.00091) (0.00194) (0.00237) 
QuesTec 0.00286** 0.00026 ----- 0.00130 -0.00088 ----- 
 (0.00124) (0.00134) ----- (0.00120) (0.00130) ----- 
Match*QuesTec -0.00169 -0.00166 -0.00898** -0.00161 -0.00246 -0.00927** 
 (0.00152) (0.00162 (0.00351) (0.00148) (0.00159) (0.00380) 
       
Pitcher FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Umpire FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
N 1,825,680 1,825,680 1,825,680 1,890,970 1,890,970 1,890,970 
R
2
 0.0000 0.0037 0.0042 0.0000 0.0037 0.0041 
Table A-2 
Parsons et al. (2011) Data Manipulations
a 
 
 QuesTec-Unique Fixed Effects 
 Diaz Black 
 A B C D E F 
 UPM 0.00888*** 0.00877*** 0.00883*** 0.00900*** 0.00953*** 0.00830*** 
  (0.00239) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00242) (0.00238) (0.00235) 
UPM*QuesTec -0.0103*** -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0104*** -0.0108*** -0.00955*** 
  (0.00358) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00362) (0.00360) (0.00356) 
 High Attendance  0.00573*** 0.00574*** 0.00572*** 0.00562*** 0.00569*** 0.00530*** 
  (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00126) 
 Attend *UPM -0.00359** -0.00359** -0.00358** -0.00322** -0.00347** -0.00306** 
  (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00149) 
 UPM*Terminal -0.00588*** -0.00589*** -0.00591*** -0.00600*** -0.00581*** -0.00583 
  (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00141) 
       
 Diaz Hisp. 
 A B C D E F 
 UPM 0.00681*** 0.00670*** 0.00675***  0.00691*** 0.00691*** 0.00583*** 
  (0.00215) (0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00218) (0.00218) (0.00216) 
UPM*QuesTec -0.00864** -0.00855** -0.00861** -0.00871** -0.00869** -0.00757** 
  (0.00349) (0.00348) (0.00348)  (0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00350) 
 High Attendance  0.00553*** 0.00554*** 0.00552***  0.00541*** 0.00543*** 0.00506*** 
  (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00126) 
 Attend *UPM -0.00329** -0.00329** -0.00328** -0.00292* -0.00308** -0.00269* 
  (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150)  (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00149) 
 UPM*Terminal -0.00568*** -0.00569*** -0.00571***  -0.00580 -0.00556*** -0.00559*** 
  (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143)  (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00141) 
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 Single Fixed Effect 
 Diaz Black 
 A B C D E F 
QuesTec -0.00104 -0.00105 -0.00105 -0.00055 -0.00054 -0.00044 
 (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00133) 
 UPM 0.00543*** 0.00543*** 0.00547*** 0.00564*** 0.00613*** 0.00538*** 
  (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00205) (0.00204) (0.00201) 
UPM*QuesTec -0.00182 -0.00182 -0.00181 -0.00191 -0.00201 -0.00210 
  (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00156) 
 High Attendance  0.00582*** 0.00586*** 0.00586*** 0.00573*** 0.00582*** 0.00529*** 
  (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00127) (0.00128) (0.00123) 
 Attend *UPM -0.00323** -0.00328*** -0.00328*** -0.00286* -0.00314** -0.00262* 
  (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00147) 
 UPM*Terminal -0.00583*** -0.00584*** -0.00586*** -0.00593*** -0.00576*** -0.00578*** 
  (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00141) 
       
 Diaz Hisp. 
 A B C D E F 
QuesTec -0.00122 -0.00119 -0.00119 -0.00686 -0.00074 -0.00063 
 (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00132) 
 UPM 0.00393** 0.00421** 0.00421** 0.00436** 0.00438** 0.00372** 
  (0.00184) (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00186) 
UPM*QuesTec -0.00155 -0.00160 -0.00160 -0.00170 -0.00171 -0.00180 
  (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00159) (0.00159) (0.00155) 
 High Attendance  0.00565*** 0.00569*** 0.00569*** 0.00557*** 0.00558*** 0.00508*** 
  (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00123) 
 Attend *UPM -0.00300** -0.00303** -0.00304** -0.00261* -0.00279* -0.00229 
  (0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00146) 
 UPM*Terminal -0.00566*** -0.00567*** -0.00569*** -0.00576*** -0.00552*** -0.00556*** 
  (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00141) 
a. Data Manipulations of Panels A through F are provided in the Appendix.  Each is a variation of that in Parsons et al. (2011), Table 5, Panel C, Equation 9 (pp. 1422) and includes all control variables 
(not presented here) originally in that estimation.  
